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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal presents several questions that appear to be issues of first 
impression in Idaho. Ms. Neal was convicted, following a conditional plea of guilty, of 
one count of possession of a controlled substance under Idaho Code§ 37-2732(c). 
Ms. Neal was charged with possession of methadone because she gave birth to 
a child whose umbilical cord blood tested positive for methadone. Ms. Neal asserts that 
probable cause did not exist for the court to find that she "possessed" a controlled 
substance where the only evidence of the substance was a positive blood test, and that 
the presence of a controlled substance in the umbilical cord blood of her newborn baby 
does not establish probable cause for a charge of possession of a controlled substance 
against her. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Neal's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err by denying Ms. Neal's motion to dismiss? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Neal's Motion To Dismiss The State's 
Information Due To A Lack Of Probable Cause To Support The Offense Charged 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Neal asserts that the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the 
State's information based upon the failure of the State to establish probable cause for 
every element of the charged offense. Specifically, the State failed to establish that 
Ms. Neal had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the methadone 
found in her newborn's umbilical cord blood. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Neal's Motion To Dismiss The 
State's Information Due To A Lack Of Probable Cause 
In this case, the State, in both its initial criminal complaint and its Information, 
charged Ms. Neal with felony possession of a controlled substance pursuant to 
l.C. § 37-2732(c). (R., pp.5-6, 25-26.) The relevant portion of this statutory provision 
provides that: 
It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the 
substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription 
or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. 
Idaho Code § 37-2732(c). Possession of a controlled substance is a general intent 
crime requiring that the defendant knowingly possess the substance. State v. Stefani, 
142 Idaho 698, 704 (2005); State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240 (1999); State v. Fox, 124 
Idaho 924, 926 (1993). The Idaho Court of Appeals in Stefani noted that, "[t)he purpose 
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of the intent element in the definition of a possession offense is to separate innocent, 
accidental, or inadvertent conduct from criminal behavior."1 Stefani, 142 Idaho at 704. 
Here, there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause for 
the offense of possession of a controlled substance under l.C. § 37-2732(c). At a 
preliminary hearing, the state is required to present evidence "upon every material 
element of the offense charged." I. C.R. 5 .1 (b). The state presents its theory of the 
charge, both through argument and by the complaint filed, and then the magistrate 
examines the charge from the state, along with the evidence presented, to determine 
whether "a public offense has been committed and [if] there is probable or sufficient 
cause to believe that the defendant committed such offense." l.C.R. 5.1 (b); State v. 
McLellan, 154 Idaho 77, _ , 294 P.3d 203, 205 (Ct. App. 2013). There is no 
requirement that the magistrate search the record and the law to find alternate theories 
of the case for the state to proceed under. McLellan, 294 P.3d at 205. "The duty to 
proffer theories of a case under which the state wishes to proceed rests solely with the 
state, as it possesses the power to bring and subsequently seek to amend and 
prosecute charges." Id. 
The State concedes that its charging documents allege constructive possession, 
but claims that, under McLellan, such did not foreclose the magistrate from finding 
sufficient evidence that Ms. Neal actually possessed the methadone. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.7-8) (emphasis added).) However, the State forgets that the magistrate did not 
rely on the alternate theory that Ms. Neal actually physically possessed the methadone. 
1 There the Court was specifically discussing cases in which the defendant mistakenly 
believed he was in possession of a different, but still illegal, controlled substance. 
Stefani, 142 Idaho at 704. Such is not the case here. 
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The magistrate simply found that "the State has presented sufficient evidence to the 
court to believe that Ms. Neal possessed a controlled substance and that she is the 
individual who possessed it" and bound Ms. Neal's case over to the district court. 
(11/17/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.14-18.) Notably, the magistrate court did not state that it was 
finding probable cause based on any alternative theory not posited by the State. 
Further, the State's new theory that Ms. Neal actually possessed the methadone 
is being asserted for the first time on appeal, which is improper. See State v. Medina, 
128 Idaho 19 (Ct. App. 1996) (an issue presented on appeal must have been properly 
framed and preserved in the lower court). This legal theory was not argued to the 
magistrate court below, nor did the State proffer this theory to the district court, and the 
State should be precluded from now asserting that Ms. Neal actually physically 
possessed the methadone. 
1. Ms. Neal Neither Actually Nor Constructively Possessed Methadone 
The State specifically alleged that Ms. Neal constructively possessed the 
methadone in its charging document. (R., pp.5-6, 25-26.) Although neither the 
magistrate court nor the district court specifically found that Ms. Neal actually physically 
possessed the methadone,2 the State still attempts to backtrack on its charging 
documents and now asks this Court find that Ms. Neal actually physically possessed the 
methadone found in her baby's cord blood; however, the State's argument fails. Even 
if, as the State claims, actual versus constructive knowledge are entirely separate and 
distinct, the "knowledge that one is in possession of the substance" is still an essential 
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element of the offense of possession of a controlled substance. Fox, 124 Idaho at 926. 
Whether that knowledge is shown from actual possession (physical control over an 
item) or constructive possession (knowingly having control over the item), is not 
determinative in this case because Ms. Neal did not have the requisite knowledge or 
control. See State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 646 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that jury 
instruction defining actual possession as requiring "that a person have direct physical 
control over a thing" and defining constructive possession as requiring "that a person 
knowingly have the right of control over a thing" fairly and accurately reflected the 
applicable law); see also State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 855 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding 
that instructions mirrored those given in Rozajewski and, therefore, were not 
erroneous). 
Because the State was unable to prove that Ms. Neal had knowledge of the 
presence of the methadone in the umbilical cord blood of B.N. and was also unable to 
prove that she had control over the contents of B.N.'s umbilical cord, 3 it thus failed to 
establish the element of "possession" at the preliminary hearing and the district court 
erred in denying Ms. Neal's motion to dismiss. 
2 In fact the district court specifically found that "no controlled substance was found on 
or near Ms. Neal." (R., p.68.) This factual finding contradicts the new claim by the 
State that Ms. Neal was in actual possession of the controlled substance. 
3 Ms. Neal's Appellant's Brief contains a discussion regarding the lack of dominion or 
control over the contents of one's blood. But c.f. State v. Rudd, 856 P.2d 699 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1993) (holding that evidence was sufficient to support finding that defendant 
possessed controlled substances where defendant ingested receptacle containing 
controlled substances and contents were not assimilated, but rather were still within the 
dominion and control of the defendant as receptacle could be retrieved or expelled from 
the body). 
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Additionally, the State fails to address the fact that the presence of methadone 
was never detected in Ms. Neal's blood.4 (Respondent's Brief, p.12, fn.3.) Perhaps the 
State is aware that this fact would certainly eviscerate its new argument, raised for the 
first time on appeal, that Ms. Neal actually physically possessed the methadone. 
2. The District Court Applied The Incorrect Legal Standard 
In its Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, the district court used the incorrect legal 
standard to find that Ms. Neal had the knowledge required to establish possession of a 
controlled substance. The district court ruled as follows: 
Possession of a controlled substance under l.C. S 37-2732(c) is a general 
intent crime, which requires: (1) a finding that the defendant possessed a 
controlled substance, and (2) they knew, or should have known, that it 
was a controlled substance. 
(R., pp.64-65, 68.) This is incorrect. The Idaho Supreme Court has previously ordered 
a new trial in a similar case where the jury relied upon an erroneous "knew or should 
have known" standard to establish the defendant's knowledge. State v. Blake, 133 
Idaho 237, 240-241 (1999). 
In State v. Blake, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court erred in 
giving jury instructions which stated that in order to find the defendant guilty of 
possession of a controlled substance the State must prove that he "knew or should 
have known" that the substance possessed was a controlled substance. 133 Idaho 
237, 240-241 (1999). The Supreme Court held that this was error as it allowed the jury 
4 Ms. Neal refers this Court to the arguments proffered in her Appellant's Brief for her 
discussion of the State's inability to establish any means by which Ms. Neal possessed 
a substance found in the umbilical cord blood of another person. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.16-21.) 
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to convict the defendant using a negligence standard. Id. at 241. The Idaho Supreme 
Court vacated with instructions for a new trial. Id. at 243. 
Here, the district court found that "the presence of methadone, in conjunction 
with her admission of not having a prescription, could properly indicate to a reasonable 
finder of fact that Ms. Neal, at least at some point, possessed methadone without a valid 
prescription ... whether she knew or should have known she possessed methadone ... 
[is one] question[] for the jury." (R., p.68.) The district court applied the incorrect legal 
standard to establish the element of knowledge, thus the district court erroneously 
denied Ms. Neal's motion to dismiss. 
The State was unable to prove that Ms. Neal had knowledge of the presence of 
the methadone in the umbilical cord blood of B.N. and was also unable to prove that she 
had control over the contents of B.N.'s umbilical cord. Thus it failed to establish the 
element of "possession" at the preliminary hearing, and the district court erred in 
denying Ms. Neal's motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Neal respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's Order 
denying Ms. Neal's Motion To Dismiss and vacate her conviction. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 2013. 
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